Ember Reed ’23 worked alongside philosophy professor Justin Tiehen on a summer research project that focused on applying the arguments surrounding universal fine-tuning to the history of nuclear close calls. (For more information on Summer Research Grants in Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, look here!)
Here is Ember’s own description of the project:
illustration by Ember Reed ’22
Recent existential-risk thinkers have noted that the analysis of the fine-tuning argument for God’s existence and the analysis of certain forms of existential risk employ similar types of reasoning. This paper argues that insofar as the “many worlds objection” undermines the inference to God’s existence from universal fine-tuning, then a similar many worlds objection undermines the inference that historic risk of global nuclear catastrophe has been low from the lack of such a catastrophe having occurred in our world. A version of the fine-tuning argument applied to nuclear risk, The Nuclear Fine-Tuning Argument, utilizes the set of nuclear close calls to show that: 1) Conventional explanations fail to adequately explain how we have survived thus far, and, 2) The existence of many worlds provides an adequate explanation. This is because, if there are many worlds, observers are disproportionately more likely to reflect upon a world that hasn’t had a global nuclear catastrophe than upon one that has had a global nuclear catastrophe. This selection bias results from the catastrophic nature of such an event. This argument extends generally to all global catastrophic risks that both A) have been historic threats and B) would result in a significantly lower global population.
Ember Reed ’23 presenting at Summer Quest poster session on campus
We are so proud of Ember for what they’ve accomplished this summer! For more information on Summer Quest and other summer research projects, Click Here!
Below are a few opportunities for philosophy students to participate in summer institutes and seminars. Many of these provide some type of funding. Reach out to any of the philosophy faculty for guidance throughout the application process.
Summer Research Grants in the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. A Puget Sound program, students conduct independent research over the summer and receive a grant from the university ranging from $3750-$4250, in addition to being eligible for low cost on campus housing. You can see some past summer research projects from philosophy students within this blog, for example here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here. The deadline is March 2nd .
Undergraduate Diversity Institutes in Philosophy. This list is maintained by the American Philosophical Association, the institutes operate independently from each other but their goal is to encourage and support undergraduates from underrepresented groups in philosophy. Different institutes have different eligibility criteria, for example PIKSI Boston says that “women, African Americans, Chicano/as and Latino/as, Native Americans, Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, LGBTQA persons, economically disadvantaged communities, and people with disabilities are urged to apply.” Some of the institutes are focused on a particular topic or area of philosophy, while others are more general. The summer institutes often pay some or all expenses to attend and sometimes provide an additional stipend, deadlines are throughout February or March.
Hannah Stockton ’22, a Philosophy major minoring in Mathematics and Politics & Government, took on a research project this summer, directed by Professor Sam Liao, that Evaluates the role of thought in sensorimotor enactivism (For more information on Summer Research Grants in Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, look here!)
Hannah sent us the following description of the project from Edinburgh, where she is studying abroad:
Sensorimotor Enactivism (SSM) was first introduced by philosophers O’Regan and Noë in their 2001 paper, ‘A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.’ Consistent with the initial enactivist theory laid out by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in their 1991 book, ‘the Embodied Mind,’ SSM posits that perceptual experience is enacted iteratively through an agent’s embodied interactions with their environment. The theory rejects the popular view that cognition is constituted by internal re-presentations of a predefined external world. Instead, it argues that the apparent richness of our phenomenal experience is illusory, and that perceptual detail, although limited in a given moment, is accessible through the active exploration or our surroundings.
My summer research project centers on the intersection of embodied cognition, temporal experience, and thought in sensorimotor theory. It is natural for us to hesitate and think about our movements in times when we cannot instinctually navigate an environment. Yet, if thought inhibits action, why might an SSM theorist consider it essential in active perception and the enaction of conscious experience? Although enactivists have previously described thought and reflection as “exercises of skillful know-how” (Gallagher, 2017), my goal is to demonstrate a clear link between implicit bodily knowledge and explicit (language-driven) thought. Specifically, I argue that thought can be motivated by unfulfilled expectations regarding sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), and that it ultimately serves to refine our implicit knowledge of these contingencies. Here, SMCs refer to the way our bodies react to and produce relative changes in stimuli. We tend to think about our actions when our implicit mastery over SMCs is insufficient, such as when we learn a new skill or find ourselves navigating a particularly tricky environment. When we first learn how to walk or type, for instance, we frequently pause to ensure that our bodies are positioned correctly or applying the correct amount of force. In these cases, our implicit expectations regarding sensorimotor changes are unfulfilled, thereby interrupting our instinctual flow of activity. Here, thought regulates our actions and prevents us from continuing with ineffective behaviors (such as pressing the wrong ‘m’ key on a keyboard). As we refine our implicit mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, we benefit from (but no longer rely on) the mental regulation that comes from thinking about our actions.
Framing my argument in the context of temporal experience, I refer to Husserl’s tripartite structure of time consciousness. Husserl’s model illustrates our experience of the present moment as consisting of three parts: retention (recalling the just-past moment), primal impression (perceiving the fleeting now), and protention (anticipating the upcoming moment) (Gallagher, 2017). With this model, we experience ‘now’ as a continuous duration-block, such that perception and movement are both temporally fluid. Importantly, this also implies that our perceptual experiences are affected by just-past impressions, thereby enabling us to experience temporal qualities of an object or property. Protentions, I argue, are informed by our mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, which are likewise informed by past environmental interactions. From this, I argue that thought initiated by unfulfilled protentions serves as a way to recognize temporal duration; and when we encounter an unchanging stimulus (relative to us) we need not rely on exploration to have a sense of its temporal duration.
O’Regan, J. Kevin, and Alva Noë. “A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 5 (2001): 939–73. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01000115.
Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Logan Canada-Johnson ’22, a double major in Philosophy and Communication studies, embarked on a research project this summer, supervised by Philosophy Professor Sara Protasi, that delved into the possible correlation of film and street art. (For more information on Summer Research Grants in Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, look here!) Here is Logan’s own description of the project:
Street art is a fairly recent phenomena in the canon of art, originating with the practice of graffiti in the late-1970s. What began as “tags”, or signatures from local artists, has grown immensely since then into a diverse range of street art practices. These practices include, but are not limited to, sculpturing, wheatpaste adhesives, yarn-bombing, seed-bombing, and even breakdancing! If all of these disparate practices count as street art, then how could film (what I call cinematic street art) fit into the picture?
First, we need to define street art. When we say street art, we’re not always talking about the same thing. For the street art scholar Nicholas Riggle, street art is art that makes the street “internal to its meaning.” Yet, Riggle himself never explicitly defines the street. Sondra Bacharach suggests instead that define street art in terms of its essential aconsensuality. Aconsensuality is the fancy word that Bacharach uses to denote artworks wherein the artist has not sought the consent of the property-owner. When an artists asks for and receives the consent of a property owner, their artwork then becomes public art. Andrea Baldini thinks that the previous two ontologies of street art focus far too much on the object and not so much the performance (e.g. “Wow, how did someone manage to get up there and make that tag?”). In light of criticisms that I discuss in my article, I find Baldini and Riggle’s ontologies to be unreliable and Bacharach’s to be most promising.
Example of street art on the side of a house in Tacoma
Next, we need to figure out what counts as film. First, I’d like to address an attribute of film that helps circumscribe the definitional parameters a bit. Kendall Walton famously contends that photographs, and by proxy film, are transparent (also known as the transparency thesis) — when we see an object in a photograph, we see the thing itself and not a depiction or representation of the object. This thesis falters in a number of ways, but most notably in that we do not have the same access about the space around us when we look at an object in a photo were we to look at the object in real life. For this reason, we need a more comprehensive definition than that film is just a portal through the image. I chose Noel Carroll’s defintion of film, which lays out five requirements for what makes a film. I won’t go in depth about them here, but they were crucial in considering what extant street artworks, if any, may be classified as film.
Long story made short: I don’t think that we’ve seen any cinematic street art out in the wild yet!
Logan presenting his cinematic street art project
I provide two examples of what I believe would count as cinematic street art, both in terms of adhering to aconsensuality and Carroll’s requirements for film. The first is simply a zoetrope or Mutoscope that has been aconsensually installed on the street. These are pre-projection film devices that were developed in the late 1800s and are now obsolete, but they are nonetheless film devices. The second involves a projected film. Imagine that there is a man who opens his apartment window every night to let some air in. In that apartment building, someone once fell out of a window to their death, maybe even that same room. We film someone falling and then project it onto the surface of the apartment building when the man has his actual window open, creating the illusion of a man falling out of the window to his death. Not only can we aconsensually place this artwork, we can ensure that it fits the requirements for a film and that it even makes the street internal to its meaning.
Given the incredibly limited scope of what cinematic street art can be, I believe that scholars have fundamentally neglected film in the street art discourse. If we want to remedy this, then perhaps these aestheticians ought to revise their ontologies for street art and create something more inclusive. Beyond academia, what I hope that my research accomplishes in some capacity is that it inspires people to try some of these street art practices in their own life.
Philosophy major Quinn Bohner ’20 embarked on a research project this summer, supervised by Professor Bill Beardsley, to explore the role of art in moral and political progress. (For more information on Summer Research Grants in Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, look here!) Here is Quinn’s own description of the project:
My research is part of a broader attempt and interest in placing art in a broader scheme of moral and political progress. I tried to explain some of the ways in which experiencing an Other’s suffering in person is different from experiencing it in art, and to advance challenge and deconstruction of a reader’s ideology as an important objective of art.
I start with the moral phenomenology and art theory of Emmanuel Levinas, as he explains art as the shadow of reality, and the way art’s political impact relies on an individual’s willingness to apply the concerns art demonstrates about our world to ongoing urgent situations, rather than the direct object of the art, an event that has already passed (or is hypothetical), for instance understanding Picasso’s Guernica as a reflection on the broader horrors of war, rather than just a lament for a city and its residents.
From this, I introduce Louis Althusser’s theory of ideology as a fundamental part of every thinking person that can sustain or dismantle the status quo, that we can call an art reader or viewer’s attention to even if they are unwilling to attend to the particular details of ongoing wars of sweatshop labor. Then I explain how we can address someone’s ideology in fiction by reifying it in character traits (such as behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs) and showing its consequences and inconsistencies as the narrative progresses.
I conclude that ideology is an incredible object of criticism and opportunity for progress in art, and that deep and sympathetic character studies can serve this purpose very well.
We are very pleased to have two excellent student research projects in philosophy this summer, in addition to other research projects undertaken in other disciplines by philosophy majors and minors. Again, you can find a list of them at Summer Quest: A Celebration of Student Research, Scholarship and Creative Work!
Philosophy major Brian Kim ’21 embarked on a research project this summer, supervised by Professor Sara Protasi, to explore the rationality of anger. (For more information on Summer Research Grants in Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, look here!) Here is Brian’s own description of the project:
My summer research project is focused on answering what seems like a relatively unassuming question: Is anger irrational? Separate from acting angry, or demonstrating one’s anger, the question is asking whether or not having anger is irrational. This isn’t a relatively new question to answer, rather it’s one that continues to escape consensus. When expanding out to literature on anger, I found a disparity in terms of a consistent definition on anger. Then, when looking to differences in the philosophical and empirical work, an even bigger problem arose: what is an emotion? A lack of consensus not only within disciplines, but between them on what emotions are adds another layer of depth. So in order to ask my primary question of “is anger irrational”, I had to answer “what is an emotion” and “what is anger” in that order to have a consistent answer.
To build my model of emotions, I use Heidegger’s Being and Time and his literature on moods as foundation. I chose Heidegger specifically because his work priorities an experiential viewpoint, something that is lacking in much of the literature. Empirical literature reveals anger and emotions to be understood by its physiological effects, in a sense by its outcomes. Philosophical works captured the opposite end of the spectrum, and instead craft anger through cognitive interpretation. While neither field ignores what it does not primarily focuses on, it’s often the case that certain elements of emotions are prioritized within disciplines. The experiential view that Heidegger offers a way to talk about emotions in terms of phenomena rather than physiological or cognitive responses. I do this by constructing further from his work on moods. It’s rather surprising, but very little is said about emotions in Being and Time. Heidegger elaborates extensively on moods and their relation to Being, but does not go further in separating out moods from emotions. My model is, in a sense, a possible interpretation of what an emotion is under a Heideggerian framework. This is, of course, just the outlines of a sketch, but even the scaffolding of my model revealed our emotions simultaneously in a new light and yet also in a familiar and intuitive way.
This project was deeply inspired by Professor Sara Protasi’s Philosophy of Emotions course that I took in Spring of 2020. I found, in doing research for the class, a niche of literature surrounding emotions, cognition, and continental philosophers ranging from Husserl to Sartre. I found myself particularly fascinated by this area and developed and grew that ideas I had about them into the research paper I completed this summer. While I found myself constantly revising and updating my theory, it was a really enlightening experience to struggle with such a broad and messy topic.
Studying emotions during quarantine was both an intensely positive and revealing experience, but also a particularly difficult and, often, frustrating one. I am incredibly thankful for the guidance and direction from Professor Protasi for not only for being my academic advisor for the project, but also for supporting me during the application process. I’m excited to see how my idea on the issue will grow as I continue to reflect as a learner.
Below are a few opportunities for philosophy majors to participate in summer institutes. Many of these provide some type of funding.
Pittsburgh Summer Program (PSP) The Pittsburgh summer program takes place from July 13th- 17th at the University of Pittsburgh and is intended to help give voice to those who are underrepresented in philosophy including but not limited to, people of color, those identifying as LGBTQ+, and first generation college students. The primary focus of the program is philosophy of science. Applications are due on March 1st and must include a cover letter, writing sample and faculty recommendation. For more information click here.
Rutgers Summer Institute for Diversity in Philosophy The Rutgers Institute for Diversity in Philosophy is intended for including voices which are not normally heard in philosophical discourse. Taking place July 19th-25th, attendees will have travel and room and board all provided for, in addition to a $250 stipend. Applications are due on April 10th and must include a writing response, writing sample, transcript and two faculty recommendations. For more information click here.
Philosophy of Law Undergraduate Summer School at Cornell (PLUSS) The Cornell University Philosophy of Law Summer School takes place from June 21st-27th and primarily focuses on philosophy of law as it relates to social justice. Attendees with have their room and board covered as well as a $300 stipend to offset the cost of travel. Applications are due on February 15th and require a two page writing response. For more information click here.
Summer Immersion Program in Philosophy at Brown The Summer Immersion Program at Brown University takes place July 6th-17th. Attendees will have room and board covered as well as a $500 reimbursement for travel on top of another $500 stipend. Applications are due March 1st and must include a writing response, writing sample, transcript and two faculty recommendations. Fro more information click here
UCSD Summer Program for Women in Philosophy (SPWP) The UC San Diego summer program takes place on July 21st – 31st. Primarily focusing on supporting women in undergraduate philosophy applications are due on February 15th and must include a writing response, writing sample and faculty recommendation. For more information click here.
COMPASS at Michigan The University of Michigan COMPASS conference is intended for promoting diversity within the field of philosophy. The conference will take place on October 8th-10th and is due on April 15th. The application includes two writing responses as well as a writing sample. For more information click here.
James Conley, a ’20 Philosophy major, embarked on his summer research project last summer to explore Søren Kierkegaard’s works in depth. (For more information on Summer Research Grants in Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, look here!) Here, he provides details on his project and his experiences working on it:
My summer research project focused on Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard’s early aesthetic works. Kierkegaard published two of his most enduring books, Either/Or and Fear and Trembling, in 1843, at the onset of his career. The content of these books is not traditional systematic or analytic philosophy, but rather pseudonymous accounts of life, love, value, and experience, akin to literary fiction, from three primary pseudonymous characters invented by Kierkegaard. The three pseudonymous characters embody three conflicting existential perspectives or modes of living that Kierkegaard wanted to highlight and set against each other dialectically in the mind of his reader. His intention was to develop the subjectivity and self-understanding of the reader in an indirect and inward way, something not possible in an analytic, critical philosophical project. These existential perspectives are the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, represented in Either/Or: Volume I, Either/Or: Volume II, and Fear and Trembling respectively.
In order to understand Kierkegaard’s existential dialectic, my research narrowed in on one central theme salient in each of the three accounts. This theme is love. My research culminated in a paper detailing the philosophy of love of each of the three pseudonyms and juxtaposing them in order to gain insight into Kierkegaard’s project. The aesthetic philosophy of love, embodied and valued by the first pseudonym in Either/Or Volume I, is akin to a refined hedonism. Love, for the aesthete, is only valuable and existentially effective in its romantic form and as long as it provides pleasure or distraction. The ethical philosophy of love embodied and valued by the second pseudonym in Either/Or Volume II, values social conventions and institutions, such as marriage, presupposing a roughly Hegelian belief that commitment to and identification with the universal conception of ethics is fundamentally important and the highest mode of living. The religious philosophy of love, discussed by the third pseudonym in Fear and Trembling, values a subjective and fully faithful relationship with God and a subsequent experience of earthly love and desire founded in faith.
My interest in Kierkegaard was sparked initially by my time spent studying abroad in Copenhagen in the fall of 2018. Copenhagen is the city where Kierkegaard lived most of his life. He often wrote poetically about his surroundings and used the city as an illustrative device for his philosophy. My immersion in the city left a deep and insightful impact on my philosophical growth and understanding of one of the most important philosophers of the 19th century. Thank you, Copenhagen.
I was aided in my project by the University of Puget Sound philosophy department. Specifically, Sara Protasi, my academic adviser who helped me apply for the research grant, and William Beardsley, my research adviser, who spent many hours with me discussing and helping me to understand Kierkegaard and helping write my research paper.
This summer, the Gender & Queer Studies and Philosophy Book Club will be meeting to discuss Prof. Kate Manne’s work Down Girl. These meetings are open to all and lunch will be provided at every meeting. Contact nkranzdorf@pugetsound.edu for more information.
If you’ll be in Tacoma this summer, consider taking a course in philosophy. Professor James Garrison will be teaching Introduction to Philosophy during Summer Session I (May 20–June 28, 2019). This course satisfies the Humanistic Approaches core requirement. The course description says:
Representative philosophical topics, such as mind and body, the grounds of knowledge, the existence of God, moral obligation, political equality, and human freedom, are discussed in connection with contemporary philosophers and figures in the history of philosophy.
PUGET SOUND PHILOSOPHY 