Philosophy talk: “Humeanism and the Categorical Character of Epistemic Normativity”

“Humeanism and the Categorical Character of Epistemic Normativity”
Talk by Dr. Neil Mehta, Yale NUS College

Monday April 17th |3:30 – 5:30 pm | Wyatt 305

The talk brings together issues in philosophy of mind, meta-ethics, and epistemology.    Refreshments will be served.  All are welcome!

Abstract: According to the Humean view, any subject’s having a foundational practical reason to φ is fully grounded in her having desires or desire-regulating systems of a certain kind. According to the unity view, foundational reasons form a genuine kind that subsumes both foundational practical reasons and foundational epistemic reasons. And according to the epistemic categoricity view, no subject’s having a foundational epistemic reason to φ is ever grounded even partly in her having desires or desire-regulating systems of any kind. I find all of these claims very attractive; the rub is that they appear to be jointly incompatible. This paper, however, is a possibility proof to the contrary: I construct a theory, the telic theory, that accommodates them all.

 

Mehta Talk flyer Draft 2.jpg

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